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OPINIONS BELOW
The district court's unpublished opinion can be found on pages 358-378 of the
record.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction over this appeal lies with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

(1) Did the statute of limitations run against appellee's claims that an oral agreement
was entered into in 1976 to give appellee real estate?
(2) Is there any evidence of adverse possession?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A question of law can be reviewed for correctness and a clearly erroneous
standard of review of the subsidiary factual determination of when the plaintiff should
have known of their alleged legal injuries. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory provision for statute of limitations is UCA 78-12-25 (2002)
The relevant statutory provision for adverse possession is U.C.A. 78-12-5 through 78-1214.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The events of this case surround a relationship between Bernard Gomez and
Marjean Deakin that began in 1973. (R. 319) Several years into the relationship, in 1977,
Mr. Gomez purchased a duplex at 468 and 470 East Sherman Ave. that was titled in his
name. (R. 316) Mr. Gomez testified that at sometime after 1977, he added his wife's
name to the title. (Trial Transcript P. 37) In order to purchase the home, he both obtained
a loan from a friend and a mortgage on the property. (Temporary Restraining Order
Transcript P.32)
Shortly after the purchase of the home, Ms. Deakin became a resident of 468 East
Sherman Avenue, while the other portion of the duplex was occupied by various tenants
since 1977 (R. 316). The central contention between the parties at the present date is the
nature of the transaction in which Ms. Deakin became the occupant of the home. Ms.
Deakin believes that the home was given to her as a gift, (R. 316), while Mr. Gomez
contends that Ms. Deakin was to live in a portion of the home and manage the other
portion of the duplex (Trial P. 39).
Under either theory, since Ms. Deakin has occupied the home, she has collected
rent on the 470 E. Sherman Ave. portion of the duplex and used those rents to pay for
repairs and to pay Mr. Gomez's mortgage. (R. 316). The relationship between Mr.
Gomez and Ms. Deakin continued for several years, eventually ending in 1993. (R. 319).
During the duration of their relationship, Ms. Deakin represents that she requested a deed
of Mr. Gomez often, but that Mr. Gomez never gave her a deed.(R. 317).
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In October of 2004, Mr. Gomez enlisted a real estate agent to sell the Sherman
Avenue duplex, titled in the names of Mr. and Mrs. Gomez. Id. After conversations with
both the real estate agent and Mr. Gomez, (Temp. Rest. Order P. 93), Ms. Deakin filed an
action to quiet title against Mr. Gomez (R. 1-16).
The lower court found Ms. Deakin the prevailing party under two of the six causes
of actions alleged in plaintiffs complaint. (R. 322) First, that she was entitled to the
property under Quiet Title/Adverse possession pursuant to U.C.A. 78-12-5 through 7812-14 and U.C.A. 78-40-1 et seq. Second, that she had prevailed under a theory of
detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel. (R. 322) From this judgment, the defendant
filed an appeal on October 11, 2005. (R. 416-17).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the lower courts ruling enforcing an oral agreement that
gave title to appellee because the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations
and the evidence does not support adverse possession. This case is based on an alleged
oral agreement between the parties in 1978 that gave appellee a home owned by
appellant. However, enforcement of the agreement is barred by the statute of limitations.
In order to enforce an oral agreement, the action must be brought within four years. The
statute of limitations for a cause of action begins to run when the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action arises. It is not necessary that the party know that a legal
cause of action is associated with the relevant facts.
Ms. Deakin's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations because it seeks
to enforce an oral agreement. In order to enforce an oral agreement, she must have
5

brought her cause of action within four years, or by 1982. All elements necessary to
prove a cause of action were present in 1978. She knew Mr. Gomez had gifted her a piece
of real property, that she had accepted it, and that she had not received a deed after
repeated requests of Mr. Gomez.
In order to sustain a cause of action for adverse possession, the possession must be
actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed
possession for a period of seven years. Moreover, the legal titleholder must be put on
notice of the adverse claim.
The findings of fact in this case do not support a conclusion of adverse possession.
The element of adverse was not met. Moreover, Mr. Gomez was not placed on notice that
she intended to hold the property adversely.
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND IN MS. DEAKIN'S FAVOR
BECAUSE HER CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND BECAUSE A CONCLUSION OF ADVERSE POSSESSION IS
UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS.
A.

Ms. Deakin's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations because the
events surrounding her cause of action occurred in 1978.
The statute of limitations barred recovery in this case after 1982. The statute of

limitations begins to run when the last event necessary to complete the cause of action
arises. Burtkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235 (1998); Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 191
(1999); Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (1997).
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When a child was abused by a priest in the 1970's, but did not file a cause of action
until after 2000, the court found that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 104 P.3d 646, 652 (Utah App. 2004). The court
articulated the general rule "[t]hat a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the
last event necessary to complete the cause of action." (Court quoting Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). The court also noted that "mere ignorance of
the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of
limitations." Id. Because the victims were aware of all facts necessary to constitute a
claim during the limitations period, the statute of limitations had run.
Moreover, the statute of limitations continues to run if a cause of action has arisen
even if there is no knowledge that the events lead to a legal cause of action. In the case of
a wrongful death suit, the court noted that "the mere ignorance of the existence of a cause
of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Myers, 635 P.2d at
86
As is similar to the Colosimo case, the events surrounding this suit occurred many
years ago, beyond the statute of limitations. (R. 316) Moreover, the events necessary to
create a cause of action occurred many years ago. Whereas, the injured parties in the
Colosimo case could have filed a cause of action prior to the running of the statute of
limitations, so could the parties in this action. According to Ms. Deakin's recollection of
the events, Mr. Gomez gave her the home as a gift. (R. 316) She asked him for the deed,
and after many years of requests, he did not give her the deed. (R. 317) Within a
reasonable time period after requesting the deed and not receiving it, Ms. Deakin could
7

have sued Mr. Gomez for enforcement of the promise. However, she did not. She waited
until almost thirty years later, well beyond the limitations period. (R. 1-16)
As an exception to the "last event necessary" rule, the courts have articulated some
exceptions where a discovery rule may be applicable. In the case of Burkholtz, the court
articulated as follows:
"The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three situations in which the discovery
rule applies:
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations
where the plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has
prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Burkholz, 972 P.2d at 1237 (quotations and citation omitted)."
The first situation is when the discovery rule is mandated by statute. There appears
to be no application of that situation to this case.
The second situation where the discovery rule applies is where the plaintiff does
not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or
misleading conduct. The courts have further limited this to be concealment of facts
necessary to bring a cause of action. "Even if Defendants somehow concealed facts
related to their knowledge of abuse, those facts would not require application of the
discovery rule because they would not reveal any facts necessary for Plaintiffs to bring
their claims." Colosimo, 104 P.3d at 653.
The third situation in which the discovery rule is applicable is the presence of
exceptional circumstances. The court notes that "[b]efore a period of limitations may be
tolled under the [exceptional circumstances] version[ ] of the discovery rule, an initial
8

showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within
that period. Burkholz, 972 P.2d at 1237 (second and third alterations in original)
(quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted).

In applying the discovery principles outlined in Burkholtz, the Colosimo court
found that regardless of defendant's actions, if the plaintiff "at some point during the
limitations period, ha[d] knowledge of the facts underlying his claim." Burkholtz, 972
P.2d at 1237. In applying, the court articulated that "[e]ven if Defendants somehow
concealed their knowledge of [priest's] abuse, those fact would not require application of
the discovery rule because they would not reveal any facts necessary for Plaintiffs to
bring their claim." Colosimo, 104 P.3d at 653.
Like in the Colosimo case, Mr. Gomez did not conceal any facts necessary for Ms.
Deakin to bring her claim. According to her recollections, she knew she had received a
gift. She knew she had accepted the gift, and most importantly, she knew she had not
received a deed despite her requests. These were all the facts necessary to sustain a cause
of action. No facts have evolved since that time period that affect the ability to bring a
cause of action.
The third option does not apply in this case because not only could she have
reasonably discovered the facts necessary, she already knew the facts necessary to file a
cause of action within the limitations period.

9

B.

The lower court erred in concluding that Appellee acquired the home through
adverse possession.
The conclusion of law based on adverse possession is unsupported by the facts. In

order to meet the elements of adverse possession, there must be actual, adverse,
exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession for a period of
seven years. U.C.A. 78-12-5 though 14.
As titled, adverse possession seems to denote a threshold consideration as to
whether the possession of the property is adverse. In the case of a property dispute
between a current and former titleholder, the court articulated that "one who claims
adversely must be able to show possession such that the legal titleholder is put on notice
of his claim." Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980.
There is no evidence to support any elements of adverse possession. The
conclusion of adverse possession is inconsistent with the contention and finding that the
house was a gift. According to appellee's account of the events surrounding this case, Mr.
Gomez gifted her the duplex. (R. 316) Under either Ms Deakin's representation of the
events and the courts finding or Mr. Gomez's claim that she was to be the property
manager, the possession was not adverse. Ms. Deakin could not hold a property adverse
to Mr. Gomez when she believed she owned the home.
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CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the lower court's judgment,findingno cause of action
exists due to the running of the statute of limitations and the lack of evidence supporting
a finding of adverse possession.

Respectfully Submitted,
77
v/

May 5, 2006

11

JAM£S H. DEANS
fr\r A«i-\p>11 ctrttc
Attorney for
Appellants
Attr\rr\f*\r

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of May, 2006,1 mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Christian W. Clinger, Attorney for Appellee, 3760
So. Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.

l\0j^
JAMES H. DEANS
Attorney for Appellants

12

ADDENDUM

13

UN i-tltl i n i K J J lALOlIUA^i

V_,WUJVJL

u n i / i j^irixv^

WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

MARJEANA.DEAKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARD GOMEZ AND RAMONA GOMEZ

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFF
Case No.: 050100573
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

The above referenced case came before the Court for a bench trial on February 25, 2005.
Present at trial was Plaintiff Marjean A. Deakin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff)
represented by and through her counsel, Christian W. Clinger, and Defendant Bernard Gomez
(hereinafter referred to as Defendant Mr. Gomez), represented by his attorney, James Deans.
Defendant Ramona Gomez (Mr. Gomez's wife) failed to appear at any of the hearings or the
trial, but was properly a party to this action and was represented by Mr. Gomez's counsel.
Hearings on Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were
held in November and December 2004. The evidence admitted therein was stipulated 1o be
admitted for the purpose of the bench trial. After the initial issuance of the Court's Findings,
Conclusions, and Order in April 2005, Defendants moved that an amendement be made thereto
addressing Defendants' statute of limitations contentions. Argument on the Defendants' motion
was heard on June 3, 2005. These Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Order are issued in
response thereto.
The Court has heard and received the parties' stipulations of fact, the testimony of
various witnesses for the Plaintiff and the Defendants and has received into evidence the
following exhibits from the parties:
Plaintiffs Exhibits and Evidence
1. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff
2. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, Love letter and pictures from Defendant to Plaintiff

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 1

4. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Notarized letterfromDefendant transferring car to Plaintiff
5. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, copies of cancel checks evidencing mortgage payments from 1980 to
2004
6. Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, Mortgage statement showing balance
7. Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, Receipt and payment for new water main line
8. Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, compilation of receipts for repairs and improvements to the duplex paid
for by Plaintiff
9. Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, November 2004 Eviction Notice
10. Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, copy of October/November 2004 mortgage payment
11. Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, Notice to show house
12. Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, copy of lease from Plaintiff
13. Plaintiffs Exhibit 13, copy of lease between Plaintiff and Tralaye Procelle
14. Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 copy of audiotape of messages left on Tralaye Procelle's voicemail at
work and at home, produced with these Initial Disclosures.
15. Plaintiffs Copies of checks to Mortgage company for December 2004 mortgage and tax
payment, January 2005 mortgage and tax payment, and February 2005 mortgage and tax
payment.
Defendant's Exhibits and Evidence
1. Defendant's Exhibit 4, part of Mr. Gomez's 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns
2. Defendant's Exhibit 5, 1984 receipt from Chris & Dick's
3. Defendant's Exhibit 6, receipt for nails
Based upon the parties' stipulations, testimony, and the evidence received, the Court now
enters the following Findings of Fact:
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L In April 1977, Defendant Bernard Gomez bought the duplex located at 468 E. and 470
I. Sherman Ave, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a gift for Plaintiff Deakin. Mr. Gomez asserted that at
n uncertain date sometime after April 1977, he added his wife's name to the title. Though
^aintiff agrees that the Certificate of Title speaks for itself as to the names thereon, neither a
;opy of the Certificate of Title nor the Mortgage was offered into evidence by the Defendants as
evidence that Mrs. Gomez's name was added to the title to the property in question. While no
evidence was introduced on this point, Mrs. Gomez appeared in this case as a party defendant
md was represented by counsel. There was no evidence submitted which would indicate that
Mrs. Gomez's name was placed on the title at any time materially prior to the filing of this
action, nor was any evidence submitted which would indicate that Mrs. Gomez ever took any
actions of her own which were contrary to the actions of her husband in this matter.
2. In April 1977, Mr. Gomez gave Plaintiff the keys to the duplex and gave her
possession and exclusive control of the house. Based on the testimony of Plaintiff, Defendant
Mr. Gomez told her the house was hers and she could do with it as she chose. Plaintiff has never
filed a Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder since 1977. Plaintiff did file and
record a Lis Pendis Notice and an Amended Lis Pendis Notice with the Salt Lake County
Recorder on November 8,2004, at the same time she commenced this lawsuit.
3. Plaintiff Deakin has continuously resided and occupied the premises located at 468 E.
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "the property"), since 1977. Since 1977, she has
openly claimed that the duplex was hers. She has told people and held out to the public that she
was the owner of the house. Plaintiffs brother, Ed Aho, testified at the Preliminary Injunction
Hearing that Plaintiff has always believed that the duplex was hers, and she has always claimed
to be the owner. Defendants have never occupied the premises.
4. In 1977, when Defendant Mr. Gomez gave the keys, possession, and exclusive
control of the duplex to Plaintiff Deakin, he told her to pay the mortgage on the duplex to the
mortgage company, pay the taxes through the mortgage escrow account, pay for all of the
improvements, pay for all of the utility bills, and so forth. Plaintiff is an unsophisticated,
uninformed, and inexperienced person when it comes to real estate and taxes. There is no
evidence that she was represented by counsel with respect to this property until this action was
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interest on her tax returns since 1977. Plaintiff has never reported any rental incomefromthe
duplex on her tax returns since 1977.
5. Nonetheless, for 28 years Plaintiff has paid the mortgage, paid the taxes, paid for all of
the improvements, and paid the utility bills. Plaintiff has detrimentally relied on Mr. Gomez's
commitment for 28 years. The Court received into evidence copies of checks for at least 20
years proving payment of the mortgage. In regard to the monies Plaintiff has received on the
property, Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any monies she has collected for rent on the
duplex. All monies have gone to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any
accounting for the monies collected at the duplex.
For 28 years, Defendants have never asked Plaintiff to send them any of the monies from
the duplex. Furthermore, the Defendants have never asked Plaintiff for any accounting.
6. For 28 years, Plaintiff has acted consistently with her position as owner of the
property in regard to her paying the mortgage, the taxes, and the improvements.
7. Plaintiff has asked Mr. Gomez numerous times for him to put the title of the duplex in
her name as he promised. Plaintiff has followed up with Mr. Gomez in regard to putting the title
in her name, and he has responded to her, "I'll get around to it, Babe; I'll get around to it."
Plaintiff has never requested in writing that the Defendants send her a deed conveying ownership
to her. Plaintiff has never sent the Defendants any proposed deed for them to sign conveying the
property to Plaintiff. The reason Plaintiff never requested in writing for such a deed was that she
relied on Mr. Gomez's promises that he would get around to putting the title in Plaintiffs name.
No evidence was presented which would indicate that the parties regarded the conveyance of a
formal deed to be essential to completing the gift of the property or anything more than a mere
formality. In fact, the actions of the parties indicated to the contrary.
8. Mr. Gomez stopped contacting Plaintiff in about 1993, Plaintiff had not heard
anything contrary to Mr. Gomez's commitment until Mr. Gomez abruptly informed her through
a real estate agent on October 27, 2004, that he was planning to sell the duplex, implicitly
indicating for the first time to Plaintiff that he was taking action inconsistent with the gift. On
that date, for the first time, Defendant Mr. Gomez, through his agent, stated he wanted the
property back.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 4

9. Plaintiff has made the following improvements xo tne property, new IUUI, new
'ater/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch railings for 470 E.,
)rn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring for 468 E. and 470
;., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for 468 E. and 470 E.,
Lew

light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468 E. and 470 E.,

everal coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E> and 470 E., 2
toves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E., and new pipes and
Irains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E. The Court received into evidence copies of
eceipts and proof of payment of many of the improvements listed above.
Plaintiff never requested orally or in writing permission to do any repairs. This was
because she primarily relied on Mr. Gomez's statements that, because the property was hers, she
vas responsible for all improvements, repairs, and the payments therefor. When Ms. Deakin did
isk on one occasion for Mr. Gomez to provide somefinancialhelp to pay for repairs or
improvements, it was her testimony that he refused because he told her that it was her house and
she could do with it as she pleased. Furthermore, in regard to tearing down the garages, the
notices from Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County to tear down the garages came to Plaintiff and
not to Mr. Gomez.
10. On October 27, 2004, Plaintiff learned for the first time through Mr. Gomez's real
estate agent that he was planning to sell the duplex in question.
10. Plaintiff- not the Defendants - has rented the other side of the duplex for at least
the past 28 years. Plaintiff is currently in a lease with Tralaye Procelle.
11. On November 22, 2004, two weeks after this action was filed, Ms. Procelle received
several telephone messages from Mr. Gomez and his daughter. They both instructed Ms.
Procelle to send her monthly rental payment to Mr. Gomez and not to pay Plaintiff. There was
no evidence that such a request had been submitted to this or to any other tenant prior to
November 22, 2004.
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DEFENDANT HAS ADMITTED THE FOLLOWING FACTS THROUGH HIS AJNS W1LK
AND ADMISSIONS:
12. In 1973, Plaintiff met the Defendant, Bernard Gomez, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
13. In 1976, Mr. Gomez had talked a lot about improving Plaintiffs living conditions
and getting her out of her rental apartment. He wanted Plaintiff to have abetter quality of life.
14. Mr. Gomez admitted that from 1977 to the present, there has never been any
understanding or conversation between him and Plaintiff that Plaintiff was in a lease agreement
with Mr. Gomez for the duplex in question.
15. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never had a lease agreement from 1977 to the
present with any tenant in 470 E. Sherman Ave.
16. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never personally collected any rent from the duplex.
17. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid any of the property taxes for the duplex
in question.
18. Mr. Gomez admitted that for at least the past ten years the monthly mortgage
invoices and tax notices have been sent to 468 E. Sherman Ave.
19. Mr. Gomez admitted that he has never paid for any of the following improvements or
repairs: new roof, new water/sewer main line, new back porch and railings for 468 E., new porch
railings for 470 E., torn down the garages for 468 E. and 470 E., new 220 volt electrical wiring
for 468 E. and 470 E., new air conditioning units for 468 E. and 470 E., new water heaters for
468 E. and 470 E., new light fixtures and ceiling fans for 468 E. and 470 E., new carpet for 468
E. and 470 E., several coats of new paint for 468 E. and 470 E., new storm doors for 468 E. and
470 E., 2 stoves and 2 refrigerators for 470 E., 2 stoves and 3 refrigerators for 468 E.,- and new
pipes and drains for clothes washers in 468 E. and 470 E.
20. From 1993 to the present, Plaintiff has not seen Mr. Gomez. They have had very
limited telephone contact.
21. Prior to the commencement of this action, the monthly mortgage invoices and the
annual payment and interest notices were mailed to 468 E. Sherman Ave.
22. Neither Mr. Gomez nor Mrs. Gomez have ever lived in or occupied the duplex.
23. For nearly 28 years, Plaintiff has leased 470 E. Sherman Ave. without any restraint
or objections from Mr. Gomez or Mrs. Gomez.

24. Plaintiff has never been required to send ivir. uomcz mc icm UUHCUIQU uum -r # v, ^.
Iherman, and during the past 28 years, Mr. Gomez has not asked for the ren,t.
25. Mr. Gomez admitted that prior to October 27, 2004, he had not informed Plaintiff
hat he was going to sell the house. Plaintiff did not receive any notice of legal injury prior to
October 27, 2004.

TESTIMONY RECEIVED
26. Though Mr. Gomez testified that he had paid two or three monthly mortgage
payments over 28 years, he did not remember specifically when those payments may have been
made and he did not offer any documentary evidence of proof of such payments or their timing.
27. Mr. Gomez testified that neither he nor Mrs. Gomez has ever paid the property taxes
on the duplex.
28. In regard to Mr. Gomez's tax returns, Mr. Gomez testified that he has never
collected any rent from the property. However, he did report some rental income on his taxes
(for the years 2001-2004), though he did not know the monthly rental amount collected. He
merely estimated what he thought the rental income was and then reported it on those tax
returns. No tax return evidence, however, tied the income reported therein to the property in this
case.
29. In regard to improvements made to the property, Mr. Gomez testified that he has not
made or paid for any improvements to the property during at least the last ten years. He also
testified that he did not know of the improvements made by Plaintiff during at least the past ten
years because he has not visited the property during that time.
30. Mr. Gomez did testify that sometime in 1984 he made repairs to the roof of the
duplex and he offered two receipts which were received into evidence. However, the receipts do
not identify Mr. Gomez's name and there is no proof of payment. Only one of the receipts even
refers to the property's address, but the telephone number on that receipt is not that of
Defendant.
31. Prior to April 1977, and continuing thereafter until sometime prior to 1993, Plaintiff
and Defendant engaged in a prolonged romantic relationship. During that relationship, Mr.
Gomez gave Plaintiff a number of expensive gifts, including two automobiles and a ring. In
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ot out of proportion to the value of the other gifts given by the Defendant Mr. Gomez to the
laintiff
32. In April 1977, Defendant's prior statements and prior and continuing actions led
laintiff to believe that Defendant had also made a gift of the real property at issue in this case
o Plaintiff, and Plaintiff acted in detrimental reliance upon those statements and actions,
easonably believing that the property was her own property commencing in April 1977.
33. Since April 1977 Plaintiff acted consistent with her good faith belief that the
Defendant had given the property to her. Nothing in Defendants' actions until October 2004
vould be contrary to such belief.
34.

For 28 years, because she believed in good faith that the Defendant had given the

property to her, Plaintiff paid the mortgage, the taxes, other bills, and the costs of the
improvements on the property.
35.

Acting in reasonable reliance upon Defendant's statement that he would "get

around to" putting title in Plaintiffs name, Plaintiff never requested in writing that the
Defendant send her a deed conveying ownership to her. In further reliance upon that assurance,
Plaintiff continued to act consistently with her good faith belief that the property had been given
to her by paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance, for improvements, etc.
36. Based upon all the evidence and the Court's evaluation of the demeanor and
credibility of Plaintiff and Defendant Mr. Gomez on the witness stand, the Court further finds
based on clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence, that in the context of Defendant Mr.
Gomez's actions, the extended relationship of the parties, the statements made to Plaintiff by
Defendant Mr. Gomez in April 1977 and thereafter, and Plaintiffs consistent behavior for 28
years, Defendant did make a gift of the property to the Plaintiff in April 1977 and the Plaintiff
reasonably believed in good faith that such a gift had been made, and Plaintiff acted in good
faith reliance upon that belief. Moreover, in acting upon her belief that such a gift had been
made, the Plaintiff made valuable, substantial, and beneficial improvements to the property
along with paying the costs of such improvements and paying the mortgage on the property for
28 years.
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37. Further, the Court Unas mat revoJcmg me gin or rescinding me gut di uu& muc wumu
be inequitable to the parties, and specifically to Plaintiff who, for 28 years, has detrimentally
relied upon her good faith belief that a gift was made to her by Defendant Mr. Gomez.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the Findings of Fact as stated above, the Court now enters the following
Conclusions of Law.
Plaintiff has specifically alleged the following six causes of action: 1. Quiet
Title/Adverse Possession pursuant to U.C.A. 78-25-5 through 14 and U.C.A. 78-40-1 et seq.; 2.
In the Alternative, Unjust Enrichment pursuant to the Utah Occupying Claimant Act, U.C.A. 576-1 et seq.; 3. Detrimental Reliance/Promissory Estoppel; 4. Fraud; 5. Interference with
Contract; and 6. Violation and Contempt of Court. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has prevailed on her first and third causes of action, as indicated below, it is not necessary to
address the other causes of action.
As set forth below, the statutory and case law elements for quiet title and adverse
possession have been met by Plaintiff in that she has shown that she was given the property in
question and thereafter has had actual, adverse, exclusive, open, notorious, visible, continuous,
and undisturbed possession for a period of seven years or greater and that she has continuously
paid the property taxes on the property during a period exceeding seven years, and that she has
made and paid for improvements to the property.
1. Since 1977 to the present date, Plaintiff Deakin has paid substantially all mortgage
payments, paid all taxes, and made and paid for substantially all improvements and
repairs to the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. Defendants have never paid taxes for the property or made or paid for any repairs or
improvements for at least the past 10 years.
3. Defendant Mr. Gomez intended to give and indeed did make a gift of the property to the
Plaintiff in April 1977. The actions of the parties with respect to each other and with
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gift and those actions would remove the transaction from the Statute of Frauds.
4. With respect to Defendants and all others, Plaintiff has had actual, adverse, exclusive,
open, notorious, visible, continuous, and undisturbed possession of 468 E. and 470 E.
Sherman Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah for at least the past 10 years.
5. Mr. and Mrs. Gomez have never possessed or exclusively occupied the premises in
question.
6. Ms. Deakin and Defendants have never been in a lease agreement for the premises in
question.
7. Defendant Mr. Gomez initially purchased the property so he could make a gift of the
property to Plaintiff. In April 1977, before changing title to the property, Defendant Mr.
Gomez in fact gave the property to Plaintiff. As between Mr. Gomez and Ms. Deakin,
the following matters, established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence,
constituted the elements of the gift: Mr. Gomez expressed his intent to give the property
to Plaintiff, he delivered the gift by presenting to her the keys to and exclusive possession
and control of the premises, and she accepted the keys and took exclusive possession and
control of the property. These facts occurred in April 1977. Plaintiff believed that the
gift occurred at that time based upon those events. Thereafter, the conduct of the parties
over 28 years reaffirmed that the gift had occurred when Mr. Gome? advised the Plaintiff
that the property was hers and when he continuously acquiesced in her on-going actions
wherein she performed consistently with the occurrence of the gift by paying the
mortgage, insurance, and taxes, collecting and keeping the rents, dealing with tenants and
the City, and arranging for and paying for significant improvements and maintenance of
the property.
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upon the statements and actions of Defendant Mr. Gomez that she was the owner of the
duplex that Mr. Gomez gave her.
Because Plaintiff was given the duplex located at 468 E. and 470 E. Sherman Ave., Salt
Lake City, Utah, and because she has had exclusive, continuous, open, notorious, and
adverse possession since 1977, and because she has paid all taxes and mortgage
payments and because she has made substantial valuable improvements to the property,
the Court concludes she is entitled under the doctrine of adverse possession to an Order
quieting title to the property in question in her, subject to any existing mortgage balance
and subject to any valid third-party lien. Neither Mr. Gomez nor anyone else ever took
any action which would constitute conduct which contradicted or breached the intent to
make a gift of the property until October 2004. Hence, no statute of limitations began to
run against Plaintiff until that time. Because Defendants took no action contrary to
Plaintiffs interest until October 2004, Plaintiffs continuing belief that Defendants would
not attempt to revoke the gift was justified until October 2004. Plaintiff timely filed this
action immediately thereafter.
Defendants are equitably estopped from any action to revoke the gift andfromtaking any
action which may be inconsistent with said gift.
The Court concludes that Ms. Deakin is the prevailing party. As such, she is entitled to
have the title in the said property quieted in her name and also to receive an award of her
costs in this action pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hi view of
the fact that no deed was recorded in favor of Plaintiff Deakin, her right and interest in
and to the said property is subject to the existing first mortgage and' any other valid lien
of a third party. No evidence of any such third-party lien was presented at the trial. Ms.
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opposing counsel pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
12.

The Court concludes that because Ms. Deakin has prevailed on the merits of her case, the
$1,000.00 cash bond that she deposited with the Third District Court, Salt Lake City
Department, in conjunction with the Preliminary Injunction Order, shall be released to
her.

13.

No award of attorneys' fees is made at this time.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that title in and to the
property described below is hereby quieted in and to MARJEAN A. DEAKIN, subject to any
mortgage existing on the property as of the date hereof and further subject to any valid lien of
any third party, but free and clear of any claim by Bernard Gomez and/or Ramona Gomez:

Lots 53, and 54, Block 2, WASHINGTON PLACE, a subdivision of Lots 12,
and 13, Five Acre Plat "A", A Big Field Survey,
Together with Vi of the vacated alley abutting on the South and East.
Tax ID No. 16-07-460-013
Commonly known as 468-470 East Sherman Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115.
Dated June

2_. 2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 6TH day of June, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the forgoing
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, to the
following:
CHRISTIAN W. CLINGER
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
3760 S. Highland Drive, Ste 415
Salt Lake City, Ut 84106
JAMES H. DEANS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS
440 South 700 East, Ste 101
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

MARJEAN A. DEAKIN,

Certification of Judgment

Plaintiff,

Case No.: 050100573
Judge John Paul K e n n e ^

vs.

D|$TR|gT

m

m

Third Judicial CMsuict

BERNARD GOMEZ AND RAMONA GOMEZl
Defendants.

SEP 1 3 2005

*1"yt?LDeputy Cidfk

SALTUKECOUj
6y.

On June 3, 2005, the court eutered its Amended Findings and Conclusions in this matter
and then at the same time "ordered, adjudged, and decreed" that title to the disputed property be
vested in the Plaintiff.
The Court signed the order on costs on July 27, 2005. The signing of that order finalized
the district court proceedings in this matter.

Dated 7/W /2005.

: Paul Kennedy
Thj/d District Court Judge

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 1

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 050910468 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

NAME
CHRISTIAN W CLINGER
ATTORNEY PLA
3760 S HIGHLAND DR STE 415
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106
JAMES H DEANS
ATTORNEY DEF
440 SOUTH 700 EAST
SUITE 101
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
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